Year of transitions

2013 was a year of transitions when new leaderships assumed charge of the government, judiciary and the army. The year saw the realignment of power between different state institutions in a process that marked the further consolidation of democracy.

It was a year of hope and anxiety – hope that new and urgent solutions would be found to old and entrenched problems. And anxiety about whether the country’s leaders would be able to chart a decisive way forward to meet pressing challenges of regenerating the economy and restoring domestic peace.

The election in May was of course the year’s biggest political event. The political transition marked a historic milestone, with power transferred from one elected government to another for the first time in Pakistan’s history. But the election did more than this. It redrew the country’s political map.

Once a formidable force, the Pakistan’s People’s Party faced the voters’ revenge and was punished for its non-performance in government. The party was beaten into second place by Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf in the national vote.

Reduced from a national to a regional party, the PPP consoled itself by retaining control of Sindh. But the question remained whether a rudderless party was in terminal decline. Its lacklustre performance in opposition reinforced these doubts, even if it seemed premature to write off the party. The PTI struggled to define itself in its new role. For much of year the party seemed more comfortable engaging in agitational politics rather than make a mark in parliament.

Political success in 2013 undoubtedly belonged to Mian Nawaz Sharif, who staged a remarkable comeback by his stunning election victory, which rested on a landslide in Punjab for his Pakistan Muslim League (N). This gave him a clear parliamentary majority and the mandate to govern without having to worry about the vagaries of coalition politics.

But the sharply regionalised electoral outcome imposed a political constraint on Prime Minister Sharif. With other political parties in charge of three provinces, this created the imperative for him to govern by consensus and carefully manage the new provincial dynamics. The fraught relationship between the PTI-run Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government and PML-N controlled centre as well as the unsettled state of Balochistan underlined the challenges ahead.

Even so, the regionally diverse election outcome handed more parties a direct stake than ever before to make the political system work. The election placed at least six parties in governance positions. Of these, the two parties that controlled Sindh and KP had a national rather than regional outlook, a positive for the federation. The message from voters to these parties was, however, the same: get Pakistan moving again.

The judicial transition, at the end of the year, brought to a close Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry’s term as chief justice, under whom an extraordinary spell of judicial activism was witnessed. With Choudhry at the helm, the Supreme Court intervened in multiple arenas, often to great popular applause. But frequent suo motu actions also provoked controversy and accusations of playing to the public gallery.

Seeking to act as the constitution’s custodian and subject the executive to rule of law, the court’s forays into so many areas invited criticism that it was jeopardising its core function by overreaching and stepping beyond its domain.

Judicial activism, however, filled the void left by weaknesses in the country’s formal structures of executive accountability. And while the ascent of Tassaduq Hussain Jilani to the office of chief justice suggested a more balanced and less publicity-seeking role for the court, no one doubted that the Supreme Court would act vigorously to guard its independence and be a check on arbitrary executive actions.

The transition in the army saw General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani step down as army chief and pass the baton to General Raheel Sharif. 2013 marked the end of Kayani’s eventful six-year tenure, which will likely be regarded as a watershed in setting a new phase in civil-military relations, marked by the army’s disengagement from politics.

Kayani’s term saw significant political landmarks. They included two transitions – from military to civilian rule and from one democratically elected government to another. But there were other developments that represented military landmarks. On his watch the army underwent a reorientation from a conventional military force to one also trained to combat insurgency.

Training for a ‘new war’ while upgrading its conventional war-fighting skills marked a significant development in the evolution of the army’s operational thought and planning. What also came to fruitation in 2013 were four years of war games and training for the new concept of war-fighting, aimed as Pakistan’s response to India’s ‘cold start’ doctrine and ‘proactive’ mobilisation strategies.

In 2013 the rebalancing of power among state institutions continued, with the election and the military’s political disengagement helping to strengthen democracy. Realignment of power within the system saw different national stakeholders – government, parliament, judiciary and military – seek a new place in the changing political terrain. This remains a work in progress. As does the establishment of a new political equilibrium, involving acceptance of each institution’s legitimate role.

In 2013, this process began to yield greater political space and a freer hand for Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to govern the country. This raised both public expectations as well as the burden on his government to start dealing decisively with Pakistan’s many daunting challenges.

On assuming power, the PML-N government set its top priorities as economic revival and solving the energy crisis as part of a predominantly domestic agenda. But the prime minister also acknowledged at the outset that there were no quick policy wins in the sea of challenges he inherited.

His government speedily concluded an IMF agreement to stave off a balance of payments crisis and announced a new energy policy, which included the tough decision to raise electricity tariffs and phase out subsidies. It also took several fiscal consolidation measures to stabilise the economy.

Having set this policy direction in its first six months and promised tax reform, the government will be expected in the year ahead to demonstrate how it will build on this momentum, implement structural reforms and translate its privatisation plans into action.

Business confidence began to modestly revive in 2013. But the economy remained fragile with the precariously low foreign exchange reserves indicating the risk to financial stability posed by the country’s weak external position. The economy will remain the touchstone of the government’s credibility especially as public expectations heighten in 2014 when the government nears its one-year mark.

Other than the economy, the biggest public concern in 2013 was the threat posed by violent extremism and militancy to internal security, and to prospects for economic revival. An all-parties conference called by the government urged a ‘talk, not fight’ approach.

But it remained unclear during the year whether militants were interested in dialogue or if their ‘demands’ were even negotiable. Official exhortations for talks did not bring an end to violence, which assumed a more dangerous form by the surge in sectarian killings and unending targeting of health workers involved in the polio vaccination campaign. 2013 left unanswered the question of how tenable the government’s open-ended offer for talks was in the face of continuing violence.

Foreign policy, including relations with neighbours and distant powers, consumed much time and attention from the government, opposition and media alike. But it remained apparent in 2013, as before, that the country’s future hinged on choices that had to be made at home and not beyond its borders. Pakistan’s destiny, in other words, could only be determined from within. This was arguably the most important lesson of the outgoing year.

The writer is special adviser to the Jang Group/Geo and a former envoy to the US and the UK. Twitter: @LodhiMaleeha