What to do with the report

The Abbottabad Commission was constituted to investigate the violation of the country’s sovereignty – by both Osama bin Laden and the US – and to determine responsibility. The commission was initially badly criticised for the procedures it followed, and now its report is also being questioned.

During the course of its investigation, the commission had also invited me – however, none of the points I raised have been made part of the report. Perhaps the commission took seriously Gen Shuja Pasha’s statement that mediapersons are just agents of foreign elements.

Coming to the report itself, I have serious concerns that some very important questions are missing and have not even been investigated. While the report fixes responsibility on institutions, it stays clear of naming individuals. Overall, though, it is a good effort and highlights some ground realities about our state and its institutions. The report attests, to a degree, to Gen Pasha’s point that Pakistan is not a failed but a failing state.

Now we have two options: either we – much like in the past – just debate the report for a few days only to throw it away later; or we take its contents seriously and try and avoid the disasters that our future generations may have to face.

Unfortunately, the reaction thus far has been typical. It seems no one really cares much about the report or its recommendations, but everyone is in a hurry to use it for scoring off against rivals. At one side we find those who can be called ‘pro-military’ who wish to lay all the blame on the civilian leadership. On the opposite side, we have our so-called democracy lovers who seem to wish to squeeze the remaining morale out of our state institutions.

Those who are pro-military never consider the fact that these civilian institutions are Pakistan’s not India’s; by disgracing the civilian institutions we are disgracing the system. The demagogues of politics and opinion, on their part, do not realise that they are commenting on the Pakistan Army and not on the US military.

Perhaps the most unfortunate part about this important report is its (wrong) timing and the way the government tackled it. Pro-government intellectuals are busy using the report against the military. The message received at the barracks is that the civilian government is trying to put the military on the defensive. With the same stupid enthusiasm, those on the side of the armed forces criticise the civilian leadership in a tone that creates deep suspicion.

The timing is bad because just before the report came out those with access to military officials had started to whisper that Nawaz Sharif’s intentions about the military were far from fair. A few others were busy feeding Nawaz Sharif the idea that certain quarters wished to destabilise the government.

Yet another coincidence proves the timing even more wrong. Pervez Musharraf’s trial was a matter that had been discussed and agreed on at a very high level between the military and the civilian leadership. This indeed could not be shared with those on lower ranks and levels. Musharraf’s issue, thus, is also creating some tension between civil and military ranks.

The report also declared that Pakistan is faced with dichotomy when it comes to its internal and foreign policies. This dichotomy is responsible for the intelligence failure that led to Bin Laden remaining undetected in the country or the Abbottabad Operation – despite our state institutions being very capable. This gulf could perhaps be better defined through the testimony of Gen Shuja Pasha, who described the cooperation and intelligence sharing between the CIA and the ISI after 9/11 but concluded by saying that one of the greatest challenges for the ISI was to keep an eye on the CIA.

Likewise, he enlightened the commission about drone operations – that they had been sanctioned by Musharraf. Enumerating efforts to confront drones, he admitted drones were useful but against the sovereignty of Pakistan.

The logical course now would be for both the civilian and the military leadership to work together to remove the gaps identified by the commission. However, all we find is more fuel being added to instigate confusion and mistrust between the two leaderships.

The most important finding of this report is the civil-military coordination gap. Furthermore, there is not even much coordination within military and civilian institutions. The gap extends even beyond these since no active linkages exist between the centre and the provincial governments. Every single institution seems to be working separately – and at times with opposing goals. The report insists that, to avoid any future disgrace, there must be some coordination system and that information must be stream-lined. But these recommendations have been ignored in the debate over the report.

If so-called advocates of the military think that they can succeed by promoting the status quo they should realise that it is now impossible to do that. On the other hand, if those who are pro-democracy and civilian rule think that by pushing the military to the wall they can strengthen the system, they have grossly miscalculated. In a country where more than two dozen officers in the military are appointed to deal with one particular country as opposed to only two people at the foreign affairs office, how one can dream of effective civilian control?

Things will not change only by demands and protestations; the only effective way is to prove one better than the other. The best bet is to strengthen civilian institutions without wasting time in confrontation. This current clueless debate over the report needs to end and a consensus mechanism needs to be established for national security and intelligence.

To my mind, a better way out is to allow the mandate of national security to the Defence Committee of the Cabinet. A powerful secretariat should be established right in the PM’s secretariat (US Homeland Security can be used as a model). Former four star generals with proven skills, a dedicated part of the higher bureaucracy, and politicians with sound mind and nerves may be part of this.

All civil and military intelligence and security institutions might be linked with this secretariat, and could report to it on a daily basis. The proposed secretariat would also work as a coordination body among the provinces and as a supervisory body over the output and affairs of different agencies. The same secretariat could be a complaint centre against any intelligence agency. The Foreign Office should also be linked with the secretariat for better coordination.

If this mechanism were to be adopted, the much needed coordination would easily be achieved without institutional egos getting in the way.

The writer works for Geo TV. Email: saleem.safi@janggroup.com.pk