Unpacking governance dysfunction

Part – II

Pakistan has just demonstrated a remarkable capacity to safeguard its sovereignty against a far larger adversary. Its resilient defence and swift response compelled a militarily and financially dominant India to de-escalate. This success proves that the state can marshal resources efficiently, integrate complex technology and maintain a credible security posture against the odds.

The obvious question then is: if we can master advanced defence capabilities, why do we still languish near the bottom of global rankings in education, health, and economic indicators? The answer is governance. The discipline, meritocracy and strategic planning applied in the security realm remain largely absent in civilian institutions.

Good governance is not a mystery but a choice reinforced by leadership. Pakistan can still make that choice, but only if it tackles dysfunction on five interconnected fronts. These are: legislative renewal to enhance oversight and accountability, a better-performing and accountable executive, a credible judiciary, political party reform and civil–military realignment, while embedding transparency, accountability and inclusion in every step.

The first front is parliamentary resurgence. Oversight must move from ritual to rigour. The Public Accounts Committees (PAC) need to be made effective through better composition, with powers to appoint the auditor general of Pakistan transferred from the prime minister to the PAC and statutory timelines to clear audit backlogs (the current backlog range between 12 years in the National Assembly to nearly 30 years in one of the provincial assemblies) professional secretariats to track compliance, and contempt powers to sanction non=cooperating ministries.

Currently, the PAC’s decisions are only advisory and not binding on the executive, which has rendered it toothless. Standing committees should receive independent research support funded by law, and every bill – government or private – should face a mandatory public hearing window. Recorded votes, live-streamed sessions, and open data portals can connect citizens to lawmaking and expose absenteeism, including that of ministers. Budget scrutiny must shift from line-item bargaining to programme-based review, with mid-year accountability hearings that force ministries to defend results, not rhetoric.

The second front is an outcome-based executive. Each federal and provincial ministry should adopt annual delivery compacts with measurable targets linked to national or provincial development strategies. Secretaries should enjoy a fixed three-year tenure, cancelled only based on outcome-based performance, to insulate them from whimsical transfers. A digital performance dashboard, updated quarterly, would make metric progress transparent to media and citizens.

Procurement reform – e-bidding, open contract portals and end-to-end audit trails – would slash discretion and leakage. Fiscal discipline can be restored by publishing a medium-term expenditure framework that locks governments into rolling three-year ceilings, with outcome-based annual budgets, not just inputs. The Federal Board of Revenue requires major restructuring, including establishing a separate policy board, a robust performance appraisal system and downsizing.

In the provinces, which collect less than 10 per cent of total revenue, there are three revenue departments/agencies that must be combined into one. The number of ministries/divisions needs to be curtailed to a maximum of 20 in the federal and 15 in the provincial governments.

The third front is an independent and effective judiciary. With e-filing and automated scheduling, a national case management system could cut years of litigation. Superior and district courts require a surge of judges. Still, numbers alone will fail without performance metrics – time to disposal, user cost, and litigant satisfaction surveys should be published for each court. Supported by enforceable mediation clauses, alternative dispute resolution centres would divert commercial and family disputes from clogged dockets.

To restore faith in judicial self-governance, the Supreme Judicial Council needs transparent rules of procedure and the publication of outcomes. Finally, constitutional amendments eroding judicial independence should be revisited through an all-party parliamentary commission, signaling that the bench is again a separate and coequal pillar.

The fourth front is the democratic political parties. The laws requiring parties to hold regular internal elections must be enforced. The law should also require that they publish annual statements of accounts and policy manifestos prepared by their think tanks. Much of this reform will depend on the choices made by their leaders and their willingness to transform them from the parties of the past to the parties of the future. The Election Commission’s scrutiny powers should extend to intraparty polls, with repeat offenders facing major sanctions.

The fifth and most delicate front is civil–military realignment. The constitution already establishes civilian supremacy; what is required is enforcement. A reactivated National Security Council chaired by the prime minister – with parliamentary intelligence and defence subcommittees receiving classified briefings – can institutionalise dialogue while preserving oversight. Defence budget transparency, even if phased, should begin with publishing non-sensitive aggregates and linking major procurement to parliamentary approval. Over time, this framework can shift incentive structures away from informal vetoes toward formal accountability.

Crosscutting these five fronts are three universal enablers: Transparency, digital government and empowered local bodies. The provisions must be incorporated to make five yearly Provincial Finance Commission Awards mandatory to ensure adequate transfer of funds to local councils. The provincial local government departments roles should be to oversee and advise the local councils to ensure effective out-come based governance of local councils.

A critical first step is to professionalise oversight and regulation. Key watchdog roles – auditor general of Pakistan, heads of regulatory bodies and other high-impact posts – must be filled through a genuinely global talent search. The best minds from the diaspora and international professional circles should compete alongside domestic candidates, injecting world-class expertise, high level of integrity and fresh perspectives into Pakistan’s decision-making and accountability ecosystems.

Measuring success is as essential as designing reform. A Pakistan Governance Scorecard, built on the six attributes of good governance, could track annual progress on indicators such as case clearance rates, committee attendance, public procurement transparency, school attendance, out of school children, citizen trust surveys on each of the federal and provincial institutions and gender budget shares etc.

Independent policy institutes, academia, and the media should be invited to audit and debate the scorecard, making governance performance a central electoral issue rather than a niche concern. International benchmark indices – the World Governance Indicators, Transparency International scores and Doing Business metrics – offer external validation, but domestic metrics grounded in citizen experience will drive local ownership.

Reform will face resistance from those who profit from the current malaise. That resistance can be softened by sequencing changes – pilot dashboards in high impact ministries, roll out open contract portals where procurement scandals are acute, begin fiscal transparency with aggregate defence figures and expand. Broad based coalitions are vital: a pact among political parties to respect fixed tenures; civil society watchdogs energised by open data; business chambers endorsing judicial ADR reforms; and international partners conditioning concessional finance on transparent audits.

Ultimately, the governance question is not technical but political. It asks whether Pakistan’s powerholders will trade unfettered discretion for durable legitimacy, whether they’ll swap short-term rents for long-term prosperity. History shows that states which embed accountability and transparency grow faster, generate social cohesion, and command respect from citizens. The alternative is visible all around us: economic stagnation, social distrust, and perpetual crisis.

The architecture of good governance already exists in Pakistan’s constitution and statutes; what has been missing is enforcement. By empowering parliament, professionalising the executive, vitalising courts, democratising parties and rebalancing civil–military relations – underpinned by transparency – Pakistan can replace dysfunction with delivery. The path is hard but not complicated; the question is not feasibility but resolve.

If that resolve is summoned, the republic can move from spectacle to substance – from power wielded for privilege to power exercised for the public good. Without it, the country will remain a facade: impressive in ceremony, impoverished in service, and hostage to the very dysfunction it fails to confront.

Concluded