The testimony of a general

Part – I

Lt-Gen Abdul Majid Malik passed away at age 96 in his native Chakwal on June 3, 2016. Among officers senior to Ziaul Haq, Malik was the one likely to become Pakistan’s army chief to succeed Gen Tikka Khan, if Z A Bhutto had not changed his mind and taken the fateful decision of bypassing five lieutenant-generals in naming Zia as the successor of Gen Tikka Khan in 1975. This transpired after Bhutto had told Malik in clear terms that he would be the next army chief.

The events of those momentous days have been recorded in Malik’s autobiography that was published last year. Titled ‘Hum bhi wahan majood thai’ the book is a straightforward account of the high and low points of his life interwoven with Pakistan’s history.

The son of a havaldar major who had seen action in WWI, Abdul Majid grew up in a remote village of Chakwal in the Potohar region, walking several kilometres to school each day, joining the British Indian army at the start of World War II, fighting against the Japanese on the Burma front and escorting Muslim convoys fleeing the 1947 massacres at the time of partition.

In writing and publishing his life story, Gen Malik sought to pen down how a majority of the political class and military rulers went wrong, landing the nation where it finds itself after almost 70 years of independence from British colonial rule and a Hindu-dominated India. He is particularly harsh on the tendency to find easy solutions to complex nation-building issues through military takeovers, ending up co-opting the same discredited politicians or worse, their B-teams to prolong military rule after their best before date had elapsed.

Pakistan’s vulnerability in military and economic spheres at the time of independence was largely responsible for a policy of excessive recourse to foreign assistance. This was to tie the country to the dominant power, the US and its system of alliances. As military relations became all important in line with the US’s strategic interests, the army became far too powerful in the national power equation.

With each new US arrangement for Pakistan’s military cooperation starting with the containment policy, from the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan to the war on terror after 9/11, Washington developed a direct working relationship with the army – weakening political structures.

Going through the usual cycle of postings at home and training abroad and completely unaware of its implications, Malik was posted to the GHQ in 1958 and told that he was to work with the team preparing paperwork including the proclamation for dismissal of the civilian government and imposition of martial law.

The plan included the abrogation of the country’s constitution adopted in 1956. This would put an end to the musical chairs being played since Liaquat Ali Khan’s assassination in 1951. Six prime ministers came in quick succession: Khwaja Nazimuddin, Mohammad Ali Bogra, Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy, I I Chundrigar, Chaudhry Muhammad Ali and Feroz Khan Noon.

The encouragement for what Malik calls the father of all martial laws came from the civilians, beginning with Ghulam Muhammad and decisively by his successor, Iskandar Mirza. The final winner of the scheme would be none other than the commander-in-chief of the army, General Muhammad Ayub Khan.

It should, however, be noted that Mirza, as secretary of the Ministry of Defence was instrumental in getting Ayub the coveted job. According to Malik, Mirza cleverly fudged Ayub’s unsatisfactory record as Pakistan’s member of the Punjab Boundary Commission. A carefully selected version of Ayub’s military career was put up to premier Liaquat Ali Khan with an all-important recommendation in his favour.

Mirza’s friendship with Ayub played an important part in shaping Pakistan’s history. After serving a four-year term as C-in-C, Ayub was granted a second tenure as the political turmoil set in. Malik points out that Mirza plotted the martial law with Gen Ayub, thinking that he would rule the country with the military’s support.

The special group preparing detailed plans for the imposition of martial law carried the documents to Karachi on 3 October, 1958 in utmost secrecy.

As Mirza proclaimed martial law on October 7, the prime minister’s office was converted into the martial law headquarters. Sitting in one of the rooms, Malik looked at thousands of congratulatory cables and letters. In this extraordinary situation, where it was becoming impossible to open every cable, one informing Malik about his mother’s death got dumped among others for 24 hours. Malik missed her funeral in the Chakwal village.

The declaration of martial law was widely greeted by the country. Essential commodities resurfaced and their prices tumbled to the relief of the general public. Those congratulating Ayub included many champions of democracy.

Problems began immediately as Mirza tried to exercise power. This was met with refusal from the generals close to Ayub. In utter desperation, Mirza plotted to have Ayub arrested by the air force on his return from Dhaka. He also wanted to lift the martial law and call elections in three months. All this became known to the generals as Mirza’s phone was bugged. It was decided to remove Mirza and send him into exile.

Malik notes that both the economy and the army were developed during Ayub’s rule. Large dams were also built but, despite all the development, his martial law should not be supported because it caused irreparable damage to the democratic process.

Unfortunately, it also led to the emergence of a coterie of yes men around all our military rulers, convincing them to prolong their rule. Some went to the extent of urging Ayub to declare Pakistan a monarchy. Military rulers ended up flouting all norms and principles, leading eventually to their disgraceful exit from power.

To be continued

Email: saeed.saeedk@gmail.com