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The story of a coup

Musharraf’s coup in 1999 was an aberration. The months leading to it were undoubtedly tense but in no way betrayed a trigger-happy general’s inclination to launch an offensive against his recently discovered nemesis – Nawaz Sharif, the prime minister.

Conversely, the prime minister seemed to be holding all cards and exuded a welcome calm and poise, and hence significant complacence, as he viewed yet another army general on the mat before him. He had forced a resignation off one army chief already in October 1998, when he asked Jehangir Karamat to resign for reasons of policy difference with his government.

Nawaz Sharif had had his moments, though, of serious consternation soon after the Kargil conflict in July 1999, when increasingly, under a very audible whispering campaign, General Musharraf was being singularly held responsible both within the government and the military for launching an ambitious adventure in Kargil and bringing the nation, its military and the political leadership to grief.

In the cautious culture of the 90s when the military wasn’t as openly prodded as it is today, the discomfort, while openly palpable, was still not loud and vocal enough to ask for Musharraf’s scalp. Though, that was exactly what went on in some casual and some serious discussions in small groups, and in the government.

The resultant ignominy of a major military setback was hurtful to the proud general’s vanity. The prime minister felt that the general might strike preemptively to avoid being sacked after a blunder that he alone was being held responsible for. However both waited for the other to strike first, in the vain hope that it just might pass.

Inaction from both sides led to a tenuous status quo. The more Musharraf seemed out of sorts and embarrassed with Kargil in the early days after the debacle, more the prime minister grew in confidence. A general on the mat was a sight to behold and assurance enough of a moral victory that the political government could lay claim to in a tenuous civil-military divide that had become rather too obvious under Nawaz Sharif.

Nawaz Sharif struck, but too late. By October 1999, Musharraf had recovered from his slight and already had a plan to preempt any move to sack him. Nawaz Sharif’s strike was at best amateurish and sadly quixotic. The army struck back, and the rest as they say is history; a sad one though.

At the advent of the twenty-first century when the world was a global village of market-based economies, where autocracies and coups were but only tales in history, Pakistan produced yet another anomaly. Even within, the society as yet still struggling to find its feet in a renewed but weak attempt at finding a democratic culture could all but revert to its usual response of a military take-over, of a misplaced hope to see better days ahead against their dismal experience with the frequently changing democratic governments of the 90s.

Within the military, it was a surprise sprung at most. The air and the naval chiefs were at a loss to make out what went on around them. As the elements of the coup were put in place, demands began to be made on the other services to provision one support or the other. Confusion and lack of direct control became obvious when one chief had to ask of the army who was in fact in charge of the country, since most requirements were in clear opposition to the status of the government and the prime minister.

After a while, on insistent need for clarity by the other services before support could be made available on the dictates of a few army generals, the army chose to simply go past manifesting a lack of trust of the other services. As events unfolded, this mistrust became a perpetual reality that belaboured relationships within the military hierarchy; the gulf never bridged. If the seeds of a latent acrimony were sown in the Kargil episode between the three service chiefs, their manifestation became a reality with the Musharraf take-over.

How it impacted the future generations of leaders in the three services is yet another story, but the marks have been deep and long with mostly unfortunate consequences. An aberration is deviational in nature and, if it stays long enough, will leave behind residual anomalies and serious distortions.

Musharraf was one such aberration. A more detailed review of the impact of this coup will reveal the cumulative damage that was caused to the military as a system in the long run. Musharraf’s impulse to seek out those who he could count on as he went long into his tenure became a compulsion. Mediocrity clothed in sycophancy found permanent relevance.

Now when Musharraf is back of his own will to face up to the charges that have awaited him, the consequences can be equally bedeviling. There is no shortage of those who feel wronged with his tenure of military rule. While there may be more profound objectives underwriting the process to bring to justice one who has violated the constitution, and hence reinforce the supremacy of the law, there may be an equal amount of personal venom that some think can override the objectivity of a due judicial process.

Somehow the two will need to be separated. That these involve apex personalities that today retain their apex positions in the politico-judicial structure makes matters even more complicated; Nawaz Sharif is a serious contender to regain the prime ministerial slot, while the chief justice was eminently wronged by Musharraf – even Musharraf concedes as much.

Then there is the significant accompaniment of a part of the civil society that is anti-army in disposition; and a media that is populated by a more critical cast of contributors that form the gallery that can be at times wrongly effective in persuading processes and decisions. Those that are the more formal part of the process, the judiciary and the government, shall have to keep above the fray and let the due process rule. With careless handling of the judicial process there is a threat that a discourse might develop into a narrative that just might grow beyond the person of Musharraf and become the cause of institutional dissonance.

Former Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s tragic hanging still rankles in the combined conscience of the Pakistani society. The question is, will bringing a former army general to an equally potent trial now recompense for the loss that has been difficult to fill? The objective to deter any future adventurist from dislodging democracy is pretty well manifested already in the changed disposition of the army in the manner of its support to the democratic process – at times ridiculed for exactly the same reasons. We can be better guided by being more rational.

The writer is a retired air-vice marshal of the Pakistan Air Force and served as its deputy chief of staff. Email: shhzdchdhry@yahoo.com

Shahzad Chaudhry, "The story of a coup," The News. 2013-04-23.
Keywords: Political issues , Military-Pakistan , Political leaders , Government-Pakistan , Society-Pakistan , Judicial process , Civil society , Policy making , Democracy , Judiciary , Jehangir Karamat , Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto , Gen Musharraf , Nawaz Sharif , Pakistan , Kargil