The scramble for power

In Pakistan, political activity heats up every year after the national budget is unveiled. This year, though, the political temperature has scaled up well before that event. With civil-military relations strained, a section of the media and the agencies at loggerheads, and some opposition parties staging a show of their street strength to bring the government to its knees, the political system – fragile as it is – has come under severe stress. The whole situation may as well be seen as an expression of the evolution that our society and polity are going through.

Social and political evolution is always a painful process, because it entails attempts by the new order to overcome the old. One side may be so keen to assume power and assert its authority that it can’t wait. The other side may be so addicted to power that it can’t bring itself to ceding it. The old order resists giving ground, which the new order is desperate to lay its hand on. The former is bent upon protecting its powers, which the latter stakes its claim on. There are advances as well as reversals as fortunes fluctuate.

Individuals, institutions and nations loathe losing their privileged position and don’t approve of attempts to divest them of what they think they are entitled to. Questions of morality or of law do not matter much in the conflict, because each side challenges the very assumptions on which the other side builds its arguments.

Recall how strongly Europe’s absolute monarchy and feudalism endeavoured to hold their own against the march of democracy and capitalism.

Remember also how violent and ruthless the struggle was, particularly in France and England, where kings – the most powerful symbols of the ‘ancient regime’ – were tried and put to death. In the end, the logic of history weeded out the old institutions to make way for the new.

The Pakistani society is also the theatre of such a conflict, though not on that grand a scale. As democracy is struggling to take root and a civilian setup is seeking to be on top in a country that has seen four military regimes, a familiar stiff opposition has sprung up. This conflict is by no means new. In the past as well, elected governments (those of ZA Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif) strove to take control only to be booted out. But the scramble for power goes on, for it is embedded in the very fabric of the civil-military relationship.

In every society, there is a power centre, broadly or narrowly based, which has an aura of sanctity about it built by a corresponding narrative. In the US, the essential goodness of liberalism is an article of faith, because it professedly creates a win-win situation for all. In China, the Communist Party is the ultimate repository of power, for it is regarded as the vanguard of the people.

In the case of Pakistan, the power centre has largely been the armed forces – ‘the protector of the nation’s physical and ideological frontiers’. Until not a very long time ago, even mild criticism of the forces in public was looked upon as too daring a venture, and bringing serving or retired generals in the dock was pretty much out of the question.

The defence expenditure long remained a closed book and any public discussion of what it entailed was strictly prohibited. The secrecy regarding the working of the agencies was religiously guarded and no one had any clue as to what they were up to. The media sang the praises of those in command of the destiny of the people, who had no access to the alternative narrative.

Likewise, the executive controlled the other two state organs. The courts were made to put their seal on the illegal and illegitimate actions of those in power including the subversion of the basic law of the land.

Things are beginning to change. The authority of the traditional bastion of power is being questioned and new power players have emerged. For the first time, a popularly elected government completed its constitutional term (2008-2013) exploding the notion that the powers that be can upset the applecart of democracy at will.

Emboldened by this precedent, the civilians think they can now show their teeth to the khakis. The judiciary, despite all its failings, is showing its independence. The generals are being called to account for their acts of omission and commission. Efforts are being made to take the lid off the mysterious activities of the powerful agencies.

The defence budget is now largely an open book, whose size and content are a subject of intense public discussion and criticism. Courtesy the growth of the private-sector media, people have access to the alternative narrative.

Tensions, conflicts and clashes are bound to crop up when such changes are coming through. As one may recall, the executive and the judiciary crossed swords on several occasions when the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) was at the helm, each side accusing the other of overstepping its mandate.

Such accusations aside, institutions do go over the top while asserting their power or independence. The establishment may believe that it continues to be the power behind the throne and that other institutions should desist from ‘over-reaching’ themselves and exercise ‘restraint’ while calling to account the high and mighty. The elected leadership may believe it was time to reign supreme and thus may be seen as jumping the gun. Freedom of expression is also open to misuse. The media may clamour for a role commensurate with its power – real or perceived – and thus at times may go over the line.

In a controversial situation, says Hegel, each side considers itself to be totally in the right and its antagonist to be wholly in the wrong; whereas in point of fact, each side is partly wrong and partly right. In the present situation, one can debate for hours on end, as is being done in the media, the validity (moral, legal) or appropriateness (pragmatic) of antagonistic positions. While the debate may be important, what’s even more important is the antagonism and the way it is handled, which will lead to a ‘new’ situation.

Conflict being the driver of social and political change may be inevitable but its outcome is hard to predict. Few, if any, had foreseen in the events of the French Revolution the rise of Napoleon or in the Tashkent Agreement the rise of ZA Bhutto. Therefore, it remains to be seen what the conflict between our national institutions will usher in: democratic stability, civilian supremacy, a more divided society, increased khaki power, or ‘back to the past’?

The writer is a freelance contributor.Email: hussainhzaidi@gmail.com