The past’s dark shadows

Much has been written about the country’s longest serving ruler, General Ziaul Haq, whose death anniversary passed almost unnoticed a couple of weeks ago. But the comment that has appeared did not throw adequate light on why one of the darkest periods of Pakistan’s political history has left the most enduring legacy.  More than two and a half decades after his death in an air crash, Zia’s troublesome legacy lives on in many respects. This legacy has not only influenced the country’s political, social and economic dynamics, but also spawned certain habits of governance that have persisted over the years.

Zia’s era was perhaps the most consequential for Pakistan’s subsequent history and political fortunes. Many daunting problems that later came to afflict the country either took root in that period or were compounded by Zia’s policies. It is therefore instructive to recall key features of that era to understand aspects of present day dynamics.

First, it should be acknowledged that General Zia held on to power for so long (1977-1988) because he was adept at manipulating a polarised political environment. He vigorously exploited the bitter division between Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s supporters and opponents, which paved the way and served as justification for the 1977 military coup.  Zia’s divide and rule tactics secured him the support of a coalition of anti-Bhutto political forces. But he also consolidated his domestic position by leveraging Western backing for the country’s ‘frontline’ role to reverse the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

An interplay of domestic and international factors enabled Zia to turn his original 90-day operation into a long political career, twice promising elections, in 1977 and 1979, and then reneging on these pledges. He combined coercion with swift changes of course. The latter earned him a ‘cancel-my-last-announcement’ reputation while also keeping opponents off balance.

Zia allowed himself to be underestimated to orchestrate the execution of Bhutto, the country’s first popularly elected prime minister. But for all his machinations that perpetuated him in power, he failed to eliminate Bhutto’s influence on Pakistan’s politics.

Four key aspects of Zia’s rule had long-term consequences for the country – all of them harmful. First and most significantly, the confluence of external and internal policies he pursued led to the rise of religious extremism and militancy in the country.

Although the influence of religion in national politics had ebbed and flowed after independence, the dynamic changed dramatically when General Zia embarked on a self-assigned mission to ‘Islamise’ the country, including its legal and educational system.

Using Islam to legitimise his rule, Zia fused politics and religion in ways that were to divide society along religious and sectarian lines. Among its repercussions was the emergence of extremist and intolerant tendencies in society, which were to polarise the country. Sectarianism also had its roots in these policies.

Combined with the effects of the long Afghan war, these policies led to the rise of religious radicalism and birth of militant groups, some of which were used to advance foreign policy goals. Under Zia, Pakistan’s engagement with the US-led effort to expel the Russians from Afghanistan mired Pakistan in a war of unintended consequences from which the country and the region were to reap a bitter harvest.

The Afghan enterprise was marked by several strategic mistakes. The most consequential was to use religion to fight communism. This produced the blowback of religious militancy, which engulfed the neighbourhood and came to destabilise Pakistan itself. Zia’s regime failed to anticipate how this involvement would import diverse sources of instability to jeopardise Pakistan’s own security.

Thousands of nationals from several Muslim countries were encouraged in the US-directed campaign to participate in the Afghan jihad. Some were to later morph into Al-Qaeda. Thus the last of the cold war conflicts was to lead to the first military intervention of the 21st century, in response to 9/11.

Apart from militancy, the witches’ brew of problems the Afghan war bequeathed to the country ranged from proliferation of weapons and narcotics to the exponential growth of madressahs and influx of refugees, making it the largest displaced population anywhere in the world. This remains the world’s biggest refugee presence even today.

The second deleterious aspect of Zia’s legacy was the political and institutional erosion wrought by his policies of repression and control. This left Pakistan institutionally impoverished and undermined the foundation of later democratic rule.

The prolonged prohibition of political activity, ban on political parties, assault on the judiciary’s independence, restrictions on press freedom, all served to undermine political institutionalisation. Weak political institutions in an increasingly fragmented society made governance a formidable challenge in the post-Zia era.

Although politicisation of the civil bureaucracy began under Bhutto, Zia’s actions also hastened the country’s descent into administrative chaos. Political manipulation of a once competent civil service, which had long provided administrative order to the country, inescapably produced erosion of state capacity. With the administrative and police machinery distorted to serve political ends, their effectiveness underwent precipitous decline.

The third key aspect of Zia’s legacy relates to consequences that ensued from his policies of depoliticisation and parochialisation. This meant several things. As historian Ayesha Jalal has persuasively shown, ‘parochialising politics’ involved encouraging the articulation of public demands in ethnic or localised terms.

This was accompanied by efforts to encourage or strengthen countervailing political, ethnic and religious groups to undercut support for opposition parties. These actions inhibited national politics and fostered parochial trends that further fragmented society.

With national issues deliberately sidelined by the promotion of local politics, a new genre of politician was spawned. This patronage-seeking politician was tied to the regime by new, clientelist networks resting on access to state resources: land, bank credit and ‘development’ funds. This patronage-driven, local influential in turn ensured that the post-1985 ‘non-party’ politics were mostly shorn of national orientation. This changed the complexion of politics, as well as the country’s political culture. Seeking elected office to leverage state resources became the principal driver of politics.

This produced a number of harmful effects: the ascendency of politics without wider public purpose, abuse of government office for private gain, draining of state coffers, haemorrhaging of state-owned banks and enterprises, and ultimately the pervasiveness of corruption throughout the system. What Jalal calls “the monetization of politics” was born in the Zia period.

The fourth aspect of Zia’s legacy relates to his regime’s disastrous economic management. It was in such management that the roots of Pakistan’s chronic fiscal crises, financial imbalances and indebtedness are to be found. Annual GDP growth averaged six percent in the 1980s. But this statistically impressive growth rate was achieved through high levels of borrowing and running down physical and social assets.

Moreover, an extraordinary opportunity was squandered to translate a combination of fortuitous factors – significant Western assistance and inflows of remittances from overseas Pakistanis – into investment in productive sectors and infrastructure. Instead the ‘windfall’ was used to finance current consumption.

Fiscal indiscipline practiced by the regime’s economic managers touched new heights when in 1984-85, current expenditure exceeded total revenue. This was a turning point in the country’s budgetary history.

Unwilling to broaden the tax base or curb spending, the regime began to borrow excessively to finance not only development but also current expenditure. The seeds of an unsustainable resource imbalance, reflected in the twin deficits of the budget and balance of payments, were planted firmly in the Zia era.

This established an unfortunate tradition, followed by his civilian and military successors of using assistance from abroad to avoid or postpone structural economic reforms that could establish a sustainable economy. The costs of delayed or no reforms have since trapped the country in a vicious cycle of external dependence, fiscal imprudence and financial crises, which have, in turn, necessitated repeated IMF bailouts.

Zia’s political beneficiaries often point to economic growth and political stability as positive aspects of his years in power. But that claim is belied by an economy left in ruins, a more violent and fragmented society and state institutions with a much weaker capacity to deliver than ever before.

The writer is special adviser to the Jang Group/Geo and a former envoy to the US and the UK. Twitter: @LodhiMaleeha