The next man

The rumours, assertions, denials and general gupshup regarding the appointment of the new chief of army staff – a most important decision to be made by the prime minister – are of course not without precedent. It’s all happened before, in much the same form, and it’s interesting to look back a few years to, for example, summer 1991, when, as recorded in my book A History of the Pakistan Army, “the Islamabad rumour mill was working hard. General Beg, it was said, did not wish to retire in August. He wanted to stay as army chief, to take over as executive Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, to reintroduce martial law, to take over the country.

“Wild interpretations were placed on the fact that the US ambassador said he was remaining in Pakistan until August rather than returning to Washington on the date his tenure ended. In Delhi, government-controlled All India Radio claimed that Beg wanted to invade and capture Kashmir before he retired. Nothing, it seemed, was too far-fetched to be retailed and, by some, at least, believed. Then it all stopped. It was announced on 12 June that Lieutenant General Asif Nawaz was to be appointed COAS on 17 August. General Beg would retire on time…”

And as to events eight years later I wrote that “The announcement on 12 October 1999 that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had for the second time dismissed an army chief led to a coup that confused most foreigners as much as it was approved by most citizens of Pakistan. It was essential, by tacit international convention, that the government’s dismissal be criticised by foreign countries and institutions, in spite of the fact that they were all well aware that ‘democratic’ Pakistan was thundering downhill morally, socially and economically. The United States imposed more sanctions, the European Union expressed ‘deep concern’, the United Nations declared that Pakistan must ‘restore civilian rule and the constitutional process’, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund muttered about stopping new development aid, and the Commonwealth suspended Pakistan’s membership. The future looked bleak.

“One intriguing thing about the dismissal of Musharraf was that only two weeks before Sharif took action to get rid of him he had appointed him Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC), while continuing to hold his army position. He had been made Acting CJCSC on 8 April 1999, when it was announced he would serve in the position for a year, but in a surprising move Sharif confirmed and extended him in the appointment.

“The only other officer to have held both posts was his predecessor, General Karamat [who Sharif had also dismissed], and, according to former government figures in office at the time [in conversation with the author], the reason that Sharif wanted to have one person holding the two appointments was that he thought it essential for his own security to have both in the hands of one pliable individual who would do precisely what he wished. Apparently he considered himself more threatened by existence of two senior figures than by one who held two appointments.

“The notion that a Chairman on his own could pose a threat to the government was and is doubtful. He commands no troops, and although undoubtedly a man of stature and personality – otherwise he wouldn’t be in the post – it is troops that matter if any physical move is to be made against those holding political power. And, of more importance, the notion that someone like Musharraf, as either COAS or in both posts, would stand aside limply if an increasingly paranoid prime minister was taking the country through constitutional hoops was also questionable. ZA Bhutto had thought Zia would be a supine yes-man, and Nawaz Sharif made the same mistake about Musharraf.

“(It is interesting to speculate on what might have – or might not have – taken place had Ali Kuli Khan been appointed COAS, as he deserved. There is no doubt Musharraf was a well above average officer, even a brilliant one, but Ali Kuli had star quality and a great deal of influence outside the military, which is probably why Sharif was frightened to appoint him. One thing is certain: had Ali Kuli been COAS there would have been no Kargil operation. He told the author on 29 May 2005 that the Kargil affair was an appalling mistake by the army.)

“It had been thought that Musharraf would serve only a token period as Acting Chairman, thus allowing the Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Fasih Bokhari, to be appointed at some stage, but when the PM extended Musharraf as Chairman until 6 October 2001 he was making it clear that this would not occur. His action resulted in the understandable resignation of Bokhari, who had had only five months left to serve as navy chief, at the end of which time he would be required to retire were he not made Chairman.”

Well, now, what’s going to happen, this time? My own preference would be for Kayani to indeed take over as head of the joint chiefs, provided Pakistan, as I have recommended for many years, adopts a tri-service organisation, amalgamating the navy, army and air force under one command headquarters headed by a chief of defence force. That way lies professional success for the armed forces.

Then, as to the next army chief: all the possibilities are attractive. They are really good, professionally, and engaging and decent as individuals. They all have the right ideas about serving a democratic government and about the proper place of the military in governance and society. General Kayani had considerable success in distancing himself and the army from interference in civilian affairs, in spite of much effort being made by politicians of all persuasions to get him to come down on one side or the other of the political fence. And none of his likely successors will for a moment deviate from the Kayani path.

So here goes: top boy by seniority is Lt-Gen Haroon Aslam who is what I call, in my old-fashioned way, ‘a good chap’. He won’t set the world on fire, but he’s thoroughly competent and a really good planner. He would be excellent as chairman of the joint chiefs in the present form of that appointment, but I’m not sure he would be entirely comfortable as army chief. He would do perfectly well, of course, but Pakistan needs just that little bit more. It’s a bit like the Musharraf versus Ali Kuli choice, without the ego of the former.

My tip, from the point of view of being next senior and all the other conventional things is undoubtedly Lt-Gen Rashad Mahmud, the present chief of general staff. I remember him when he was on Aslam Beg’s staff as a major, way back, and I noticed him, then, as a most competent officer. If the chairman of the joint chiefs is to remain a ceremonial and advisory appointment, he would of course be good, but I’m not sure he would like it.

Then there’s Lt-Gen Raheel Sharif, another competent and well-above-average officer – but a close associate of Musharraf. I think, perhaps, forget him, because Nawaz is an unforgiving man.

There are some other possibilities, but the first of the last must be the controversial Lt-Gen Tariq Khan, the soldiers’ soldier, who is comparatively junior and whose personal file in the military secretary’s office in Rawalpindi is, as a correspondent wrote to me last week, “not just underlined in red but covered in red ink.” He’s a tough guy, a Pakhtun, and clever with it.

And his subordinates really like him. Not that he goes out of his way to seek their approval: far from it; but he’s fair and hard-hitting when he knows the course he has chosen is the right one, as when he got stuck in to the militants in South Waziristan. He’s got the measure of the Taliban and he’s totally apolitical and hard-nosed with Washington, which might appeal to Sharif.

So let’s see. But let’s hope that this time round Nawaz Sharif will make the right choice. After all, he doesn’t want to have another enforced sojourn in Saudi Arabia.

The fourth edition of the writer’s book, A History of the Pakistan Army, is to be published next month by OUP Karachi.

The writer is a South Asian affairs analyst.  Website: www.beecluff.com