The final battle

While the challenges the state of Pakistan is confronted with are many, the greatest is the insurgency that emanated from Balochistan and Fata, which, over the years, has enveloped the whole country and threatens to undermine its foundations. Of the two the Fata insurgency has intensified at a faster pace, caused greater damage, and is presently more threatening.

This raises the question why, despite the much acclaimed operations in Swat and South Waziristan, and despite suffering heavy casualties (reportedly 5,000 martyred, 10,000 wounded), the previous army command failed to eliminate the TTP and its associates. As a result the insurgents are stronger today than when the army made its first foray into the Waziristans in 2004; the insurgents continue to hit chosen targets across the country with impunity.

In the process, they have created a sense of uncertainty and insecurity in the minds of the people who, understandably, have begun to see the insurgents as larger-than-life fighters. Yet the prime minister continues to dither. Does he have to be reminded that he is the prime minister of a country at war? The people are now looking towards the army’s new command to save Pakistan. Since the situation will ultimately be handed over to them, they must reflect on why the previous army command failed to achieve a decisive victory in Swat and South Waziristan.

Their reflection, hopefully, would lead them to conclude that the strategy employed in the two operations was space-oriented, not elimination-oriented; this is why the insurgents were able to escape to fight another day, which is what they are doing with considerable success.

The army command must resist the tendency to fight the next war on the pattern of the last war, and opt for an elimination-oriented strategy. The focal point of this is the classic anti-guerrilla manoeuvre of ‘tightening the noose’, which entails sealing off the area chosen for the operation to prevent exit from and entry into it, prior to releasing the main offensive on a broad front; this is then followed by the two forces (sealing off and offensive) alternating as hammer and anvil until the noose is tightened and the insurgents are strangulated. The army would do well to rehearse this manoeuvre, though on a smaller scale for obvious reasons.

The area chosen for the operation is likely to be North Waziristan as it is the hub of the insurgents. The area is a mass of rugged hills and mountains, cliffs, ravines and defiles; there are few roads and movement on these is vulnerable to interdiction. It shares a 150 km border with the Afghan provinces of Khost and Paktia. Six-hundred-thousand people inhabit the area, mostly in the valleys.

Among them live an estimated 20,000 insurgents of different hues – fighters of Sirajuddin Haqqani, Hafiz Gul Bahadur, TTP, and some from a number of jihadi groups. They are skilled in their craft, know the terrain well, and are said to enjoy the support of the local population. Therefore, the environment in which the operation will be conducted would be less than favourable.

Yet this is a job that has to be done, and the only manoeuvre that is capable of creating the desired strategic and tactical effects on the insurgents is ‘tightening the noose’, provided that the right soldier-to-guerrilla ratio has been established on the basis of intelligence gathered, the required infantry resources and helicopters are available, the troops have been trained for it, and skilled generals direct it. In the event, the operation will stand a good chance of being successful certainly before the exit of foreign forces from Afghanistan.

Since intelligence gathering is far more difficult in a guerrilla warfare setting, it would be better to err on the side of excess. History has proved time and again that under-resourced operations rarely succeed, least of all, counter-insurgency operations; on the other hand, indifferent generalship can make a mess of operations even though the requisite resources are available.

These insurgents are essentially mountain fighters. They will make full use of the higher terrain to hide and dominate the valleys and roads. The heights, therefore, will have to be secured during the sealing off phase in order to force them to descend into the valleys where they would be exposed to the army’s ground and air delivered fire power.

Now is the time to ask the Americans to support the operation by taking out the Pakistani insurgents – Fazlullah et al – in the bordering Afghan provinces, by preventing the insurgents in North Waziristan from crossing the border into Afghanistan, and vice versa, and by employing killer drones in conjunction with the Pakistan Army. Likewise, it would also help immensely if Mullah Omar, Sirajuddin Haqqani and Hafiz Gul Bahadur are persuaded to stay out of the fight. Once the insurgents in the hub are crushed, crushing those outside it would become relatively easier. Needless to say, failure of the North Waziristan operation will have far-reaching implications for the country.

Another dimension the federal and provincial governments need to be wary of is the backlash across the country that could follow the launch of the operation. How to pre-empt or at least minimise the incidence of acts of terror will be a great challenge that. The performance of our intelligence and law-enforcement agencies in this regards so far does not inspire confidence.

As for the insurgency in Balochistan, the political powers should post-haste initiate talks with Baloch insurgents, redress the grievances that led to the insurgency and arrive at an amicable settlement – despite the so-called ‘hidden hand’ that had ignited the flames of insurgency and will make every effort to keep the flames burning. It is incumbent upon the intelligence agencies to uncover the ‘hidden hand’ and chop it off.

In a recent talk show, journalist Saleem Safi revealed that the previous army chief had told him that an operation in North Waziristan would stand only a ten percent chance of success. While it is true that North Waziristan is the hardest nut to crack, imaginative application of force by the new army chief can vastly increase the odds in his favour. Sadly, the previous army chief was found wanting in this as seen in the Swat and South Waziristan operations planned by him. Success will be ten percent if the new chief replicates the strategy and tactics employed by his predecessor.

The writer is a retired brigadier.Email: javedhussainpa@yahoo.com