DIALOGUE is a meaningful process. It should not be denied or abandoned on the basis of certain apprehensions or presumptions about the outcome alone. Somehow the ongoing debate on whether the government should talk to the Pakistani Taliban or not entails many assumptions and fears.
First, it is assumed that the outcome of peace talks would eventually put the Taliban at an advantage. Secondly, many analysts fear, based on past deals like the Swat agreement, that the Taliban would not abide by any peace agreement and would use it as a bid tostrengthen their position and further their agenda.
Such an outlook gathers more strength from some tactical-level objections which are raised concerning the methodology, process and conditions for peace talks.
Forinstance.auestions reeardinethe political face of Ehe Pakistani Taliban, the state talking from a position of strength, and the Taliban`s demands, reflect rigidity and a mindset on the part of both the state and the militants that tends to enter the talks process after getting 100pc assurance of success.
Interestingly, some analysts who oppose peace talks with the Taliban are not in favour of military operations against them, at least in North Waziristan. They argue that military operations will only lead to more terrorism in the country.
If neither talks nor the use of force offer a viable answer to militancy, then what other options do we have? Some might argue that instead of talking to the militants there is a need to focus more on countering urban terrorism. But such an approach would have very limited scope and would not address the problem of militancy in Pakistan`s tribal areas.
Looking into the diversity and geographical spread of the problems of militancy and violence facing Pakistan, it would be unrealistic to regard this approach as effective.
The previous government had done a commendable jo b in removing the constitutional and legal hurdles while approving the Fair Trial Bill, the National Counterterrorism Authority Bill and introducing amendments in antiterrorism laws.Most of these initiatives were taken near the completion of the previous parliament`s tenure. But these laws should help the new government in formulating a well-coordinated counterterrorism strategy.
The real question is: can we get a long-term, comprehensive solution by addressing only the technical aspects of the problem? Some analysts use the term `holistic approach` in this context, but the contours of this are not yet clear. Yet dialogue remains an influential component of any conflict-resolution framework.
A peace process itself determines its modalities as it progresses. Initially, theonly thing which is required for initiating the process is the will of the state and non-state actors to engage in it.
The newly formed PML-N government has the public mandate to initiate peace talks with the Pakistani Taliban. As the PML-N leaders had been pronouncing this stance since the start of the electoral campaign, it could be argued that the people of Pakistan voted for the party for this particular aspect of their manifesto among others. The Taliban have also shown their willingness to talk to the government, though they have often changed their mind.
The militants are rational actors who use violence to maximise their perceived benefits economic, political or ideological. In response, the state has the right to evolve strategies to minimise the advantages the militants have in mind. One effective way to do so, ie minimise the militants` perceived advantages, is to engage them in talks.
The use of force against terrorists provides certain strategic advantages to the state, but terrorists seek to draw moral and political advantages from military actions. As terrorists enjoy more freedom in the propaganda war since they do not need to prove their claims contrary to the state, they exploit the `brutality` of the state to weaken its moral position.
The engagement of non-state actors in the peace process basically helps thestate neutralise their propaganda edge. When they get engaged in peace talks they have to share certain responsibilities and their ability to indulge in propaganda is reduced.
No doubt the Pakistani Taliban are not a monolithic entity. Even the Tehreek-iTaliban Pakistan (TTP) is not a monolithic organisation. No one can deny the diversity among the militants` rank and file and their complex nexus with local and international terrorists in ideological and operational perspectives.
Despite the immense level of destruction caused by the Pakistani Taliban, the state never abandoned communication channels and still continues to engagetheir different factions. But the objectives of such attempts have been apparently tactical and limited in scope. The same channels can be employed for a broader reconciliation process.
The TTP`s demands are the most critical aspect of the issue.Reportedly, among other things the militants want the non-interference of Pakistan in the Afghan conflict as well as constitutional and foreign policy changes in accordance with their interpretation of Quran and Sunnah. The militants also call for a war of `revenge` against India.
Many people view these demands as unrealistic and non-negotiable. There is a need to explore that if the government does show flexibility, which sort of demands will the Taliban compromise on.
The government has not disclosed its demands yet, but a reduction in violence would be its top priority. In this perspective, will the government agree on the model of Sharia enforcement of 1993 between the then NWFP government and Sufi Mohammad? Or on a deal similar to the one that was signed between the Awami National Party government and Mullah Fazlullah more recently? It must be kept in mind that neither were successful.
One thing stands out: the peace process is always a long exercise. one should not expect that if the state takes this initiative, it would resolve the issue within weeks or months.
This is a game in which both state and non-state actors not only continue testing each other`s muscles, but temperaments as well. The writer is a political analyst.
Muhammad Amir Rana, "The dilemma of talks," Dawn. 2013-06-16.Keywords: Political science , Political issues , Military operations , Military actions , Terrorists , Taliban , Militancy , Sufi Mohammad , Mullah Fazlullah , North Waziristan , PMLN , TTP , NWFP