Talks with no outcome

Recent diplomatic exchanges between Pakistan and India are akin to being on a treadmill: plenty of activity and movement without going anywhere. There have been a series of informal, high-level interactions last month on the sidelines of multilateral conferences – an Asia Europe meeting (ASEM) in Delhi and the Commonwealth Summit in Colombo. But these discussions have yielded no outcome.

This has left the formal dialogue in pause mode and normalisation efforts at a standstill. This is mainly a result of Delhi’s lack of reciprocity to Pakistan’s many positive gestures since Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s advent in power. These gestures have earned Islamabad international appreciation, and served to signal that Pakistan is not the obstacle in moving the peace process forward.

But for its part, India has ruled out resumption of the broad-based peace dialogue, despite repeated urgings by Pakistani officials – most recently by Sartaj Aziz during his mid-November visit to Delhi. Instead, Indian officials have alternated between setting conditions for reviving formal talks and narrowing the bandwidth for dialogue by cherry picking issues of priority for India.

The impasse over renewing the ‘composite’ dialogue is likely to persist until at least India’s general elections, due by May 2014. But it raises questions about Delhi’s post-election stance and the diplomatic strategy the next government might adopt in dealing with Pakistan.

In mid-October India’s External Affairs Minister, Salman Khurshid, publicly reiterated that Delhi would not quickly return to the composite dialogue process. That has been apparent in spite of Islamabad’s efforts to accelerate the normalisation process since Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif assumed office. Prime Minister Sharif’s September 29 meeting with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in New York ended with the Indian side making “improvement of the situation” on the Line of Control a “precondition” for “forward movement” in relations.

Although LoC tensions have largely subsided (much fewer ceasefire violations in November compared to earlier months), the Indian posture on resuming formal talks has remained unchanged. This became apparent from various Indo-Pakistan encounters in November – Sartaj Aziz’s meeting on November 12 with Salman Khurshid, National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon and later Prime Minister Singh as well as Prime Minister Sharif’s brief November 16 meeting with Salman Khurshid in Colombo – all of which were described as “courtesy calls” by officials on both sides.

Enough is known about these meetings to draw three conclusions. One, that the Indian side has shown no interest to resume the formal dialogue. Whether this posture is a function of election politics or an indication of how India wants to conduct future business with Pakistan will become clearer after the elections.

Two, in almost every encounter, the Indian side seemed to set conditions – even if they were not called that – for returning to the full fledged talks process. Whether it was establishing “tranquillity on the LoC” or “concretely” concluding the Mumbai trial, goal posts were laid out for Pakistan. India’s consideration of resuming comprehensive talks was made contingent on Islamabad meeting these.

And three, in several of these meetings Indian officials signalled that while they might be willing to engage on some issues (trade, terrorism), but on others of high priority for Islamabad (Kashmir, Siachen, Sir Creek, water), they were less than forthcoming. This suggested a selective engagement approach to dialogue; and even this seemed predicated on Pakistan fulfilling prior conditions.

In consequence no dates for meetings between the two countries have been set for the coming months. Even the meeting between the directors general of military operations, agreed in New York and reaffirmed in Delhi, has not materialised with each side claiming the other has not indicated a date. Pakistan’s proposal that such a meeting should take place in the context of the wider issue in dispute and include foreign ministry participants was turned down by Delhi.

Although “agreement in principle” was reached during Aziz’s Delhi visit for two other meetings to convene at the ‘technical’ level, dates for these have yet to be decided. If they do take place they will be ‘outside’ the structured talks framework. The first ‘technical’ level meeting envisaged is between the secretaries of water and power in order to pursue the proposal for electricity import from India.

The second, between commerce secretaries, would aim to follow up on the road map agreed in talks that took place at the same level in September 2012. The delay in embarking on this serves as a telling example of how vitiation of the bilateral atmosphere has led to a hiatus in an area that both sides evidently want to promote.

Another track proposed by Pakistan in New York – twice-yearly meetings of the two countries’ national security advisers – is said to have elicited Indian interest during Sartaj Aziz’s Delhi sojourn. But Menon has yet to come back to convey acceptance of this ‘mechanism’.

While these are all process issues, on substance, there was a revealing exchange between Aziz and the Indian prime minister during his call on him on November 13. When Aziz suggested that Siachen and Sir Creek were two “doable” issues amenable to resolution, Singh replied that as Siachen had been affected by the Kargil experience it could now only be addressed as part of an overall settlement of Jammu and Kashmir. This further reinforced Islamabad’s impression, fuelled by the last two rounds of talks on the issue, of a progressive hardening in Delhi’s position. Interestingly, Prime Minister Singh did not respond on the Sir Creek issue.

From the perspective of a long troubled relationship, that these diplomatic encounters took place at all is helpful to lower tensions between the two countries and improving the tone of relations. But diplomatic activity must also produce movement. To endlessly be talking about talks is a recipe for frustration and not progress. More importantly it raises questions about what the post Indian election outcome might hold for the normalisation process.

Will Delhi persist with this conditional and selective approach to engagement with Pakistan? If that were to happen it would mean that India would mimic a strategy it pursued in vain from 2008 to early 2011, when Delhi halted the comprehensive dialogue process and made its revival conditional upon action by Pakistan on Mumbai prosecutions.

At the time, Indian officials also began to question the utility of the ‘composite dialogue’ framework that encompasses a comprehensive eight-point agenda (drawn up in 1997 and which proceeded uninterrupted between 2004 and 2007). They did so by indicating they only wanted to talk on some issues and not others. Hints were dropped about changing the structure of the dialogue.

But then India changed diplomatic course and decided in 2011 to return to the ‘composite’ talks, in all but name. Two rounds of talks later, with the third having barely begun, India again suspended formal dialogue in January 2013 after the flare up of LoC tensions. They have not since resumed.

Any effort by India to alter the terms or structure of the dialogue will not work in the future any more that it did in the past. Since 2001, Delhi’s on-off approach to diplomatic engagement with Pakistan in which it has sought to use dialogue as a concession or ‘reward’ has proven counterproductive to its own stated goals. It has set back progress on trade and people-to-people contacts that Delhi has long prioritised.

Moreover, narrowing the scope of the dialogue will be resisted by Islamabad. And it will hardly make contentious issues go away. Bilateral engagement cannot after all reflect unilateral priorities. Nor can one side dictate the agenda. Multilayered talks on an already agreed framework covering the entire gamut of issues offer the most realistic way to achieve progress in normalising ties.

The resurrection of a comprehensive peace process remains the most viable vehicle to manage differences and build on areas of convergence. Only by efforts to address the causes and not just symptoms of long-standing tensions can durable peace be established.

The writer is special adviser to the Jang Group/Geo and a former envoy to the US and the UK.  Twitter: @LodhiMaleeha