State of uncertainty

The meeting in New York between prime ministers Nawaz Sharif and Manmohan Singh helped to ratchet down tensions that had surged in recent months between the two countries. It yielded agreement to deal with the most immediate cause of those tensions: violations of the 2003 ceasefire on the Line of Control in Kashmir.

But the meeting did not remove the shadow of uncertainty that hangs over the future of the bilateral relationship. India’s unwillingness, conveyed at New York, to resume the broad-based formal dialogue suggests this uncertainty will deepen rather than dissipate in the next seven months until India’s general elections, due by May 2014.

This state of uncertainty can expose relations to turbulence in an already fraught regional environment. Sustained diplomatic engagement often helps to limit this. It also means Pakistan will have to wait for India’s election season to be over to transact serious business with Delhi in order to put relations on a steadier track towards normalisation.

Both sides had set modest expectations for the September 29 diplomatic encounter in New York. These were largely met by the two prime ministers’ agreement to direct their respective directors-general of military operations to meet to evolve a mechanism to investigate LoC violations and prevent recurrence of such incidents. Border clashes have claimed the lives of both Pakistani and Indian soldiers since tensions flared in January. India has accused the Pakistani side of 150 violations in this period while Pakistan cites 286 violations by Indian forces since January. No date or time frame was set in New York for the military officers’ meeting. But it is likely to take place in the next few weeks and will be the first such encounter in 14 years.

In New York the Indian side made “progress” on “restoring peace and tranquillity on the LoC” a “precondition” for the renewal of a full-fledged dialogue on other issues. This was evident from the media briefing by India’s national security advisor, Shivshankar Menon, when he said that improvement of the situation on the Line of Control was a “precondition” for “forward movement” in relations. India’s president has since reiterated this condition.

This stance effectively rules out early revival of the “composite” dialogue that Islamabad has actively sought since Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s assumption of power. Without agreement at New York to resume these talks, no formal diplomatic engagement is envisaged in the months ahead, other than the meeting of military officials. An opportunity for informal high-level engagement will come on the sidelines of multilateral ministerial meetings, for example a meeting of ASEM (an Asia-Europe forum) in Delhi in November, if Pakistan decides to attend. Although the ‘backchannel’ is expected to remain in play, lack of formal dialogue will place relations on prolonged diplomatic pause until next year.

Despite the Indian media’s depiction of the New York encounter as a “non-event”, the discussion at the meeting was substantive even if the outcome was modest. The dialogue ranged over almost all contentious issues and irritants that divide the two countries. Although each side ended up reiterating their well-known position, the diplomatic exchange at the highest political level on these issues was important. If Prime Minister Singh’s focus – apart from the LoC incidents – was on terrorism and bringing the perpetrators of the Mumbai attack to justice, Prime Minister Sharif was forthright in stressing the need for a cooperative approach rather than trading accusations on terrorism that Pakistan too is a victim of.

Prime Minister Sharif also did some plain speaking in urging his Indian counterpart to address Pakistan’s concerns on India’s support for Baloch militants. Singh is said to have rejected this assertion. But on Prime Minister Sharif’s insistence, agreement was reached that the national security advisors of the two countries would be charged with “discussing and allaying each other’s concerns”.

Discussion wasn’t just confined to this exchange. Prime Minister Sharif called for addressing the Kashmir dispute as well as Siachen, Sir Creek and water issues, pointing out that progress could not be made without resolving these disputes. On Kashmir, the Indian Prime Minister restated Delhi’s familiar position that there can be “no redrawing of borders” and ways instead should be found to make the LoC “irrelevant”.

The meeting also took up economic and trade relations, which both sides are evidently anxious to boost. When Manmohan Singh raised the matter of delay in Pakistan’s grant of Most Favoured Nation status to India, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif pointed out that progress on this slowed when the dialogue process itself stalled. But he told Singh he had directed the relevant ministries to address the misgivings of agriculture and industry groups who are likely to be adversely affected by the MFN move. On energy cooperation, Prime Minister Sharif again referred to a slowing down on India’s part and not Pakistan’s.

If this discussion laid bare the challenge ahead of finding common ground on a wide array of issues on which priorities differ and positions remain wide apart, other questions are also raised about the future of the Pakistan-India peace process. A key question is whether India’s approach to normalising ties will continue to be conditions-based, as is the case at present and has also been in the recent past.

For example, Delhi halted all dialogue in the wake of the Mumbai incident in November 2008. The diplomatic hiatus lasted until March 2011, during which India called for action by Pakistan on the Mumbai case as a pre-condition to resume talks. Only when Delhi changed this stance was agreement forthcoming on restarting the dialogue. The third round of the “composite” dialogue had just begun last year when India again suspended talks in early 2013.

Since then Delhi has repeatedly declined Pakistan’s offer to renew the formal dialogue. Setting goal posts as the prerequisite for revival of the wider dialogue is a diplomatic posture that proved untenable for India to sustain in the past. And so it will in the future.

It is also self-defeating because it means key objectives that India has long sought from such dialogue – movement on the ‘soft’ issues of trade and people-to-people contacts – are being cast aside by Delhi itself.

It is one thing if electoral considerations temporarily drive Delhi to take this negotiate-by-setting-conditions posture. But if this becomes Delhi’s preferred way of diplomatic engagement with Pakistan after elections, it will thwart meaningful progress or sustainable normalisation of relations.

Other uncertainties also loom. The most important of these is how a Narendra Modi-run India will deal with Pakistan. Many Indian analysts rule out an outright electoral victory for the man named as their prime ministerial candidate by the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). But it is much too early to discount the chances of a Modi premiership. Having emerged as a polarising figure in his own country, Modi will give Islamabad new cause for worry. Five state elections in November-early December will test India’s national mood and be an early indicator of the two major parties’ electoral strength. If the BJP is able to wrest control of states that Congress currently holds, this could boost its prospects for the 2014 polls.

Islamabad has of course dealt with a BJP government in the past. Some would argue it is ‘easier’ to manage relations with India when it is ruled by a strong, right-wing government able to take tough decisions and make diplomatic compromises. But for now there are too many unknowns about Modi to support such a sanguine view.

The near term outlook for Pakistan-India relations places it in a zone of uncertainty. If some of this uncertainty, and its risk of instability, can be mitigated by mutual efforts to calm the Line of Control, this goal is worth pursuing expeditiously. But so also is a ceasefire by Delhi on verbal assaults against Pakistan that it continues to make at international forums and at home.

The writer is special adviser to the Jang Group/Geo and a former envoy to the US and the UK.

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