Raids and reports

The people of Pakistan eagerly awaited answers to critical questions in the Abbottabad Commission Report. Was Osama bin Laden residing in the Abbottabad compound? The commission declared that OBL had lived there for six years and was present in the compound on May 2.

Most Pakistanis may not be convinced by this. How could this multi-storeyed house, highly conspicuous due to its 18 feet high walls with barbed wires, fail to attract the attention of its neighbours? It is unbelievable that the entire chain of various federal and provincial law-enforcement and security and intelligence agencies — especially the local police and special branch — remained ignorant about the identity of the compound’s residents.

Was OBL killed in the May 2 operation? While the report concluded in the affirmative, its statement that the “mathematical probability of OBL’s death is less than 100 percent certain” raises eyebrows. On the positive match of DNA results taken from OBL’s ‘blood’ on the floor, the commission’s view is again interesting: “DNA testing alone cannot determine whether person concerned was dead or alive”.

The onus thus remains on the US government to provide solid evidence that it was indeed the real Osama bin Laden who was killed on May 2 and whose body was dumped into the Arabian Sea. Why did the US authorities withhold release of any photographs or videos made by the special forces/Seals?

On May 2 and the days that followed, the country witnessed an unprecedented state of confusion in Islamabad’s power corridors. Both the president and the prime minister remained uninformed as foreign forces violated Pakistan’s sovereignty.

In any other country, the president or prime minister would have convened an emergency session of top national security aides, including the armed forces chiefs, to deal with the crisis situation. It was after persistent public outrage and conflicting government responses that a session of the Defence Committee of Cabinet was convened on May 12 — ten days after the Abbottabad raid.

The commission observed that in their initial communications the US operation was welcomed by both the president and the prime minister. Although the report mentioned President Zardari’s article that appeared in the Washington Post on May 2, 2011, it failed to solve the mystery of how this article managed to get published in such a short time.

When linked with our high commissioner to the UK’s immediate comments (also quoted in the report) in the foreign media that “what ever has happened has happened with our consent”, it gives strength to the perception that the top leadership had some prior information of the US operation. Why did the commission not give a clear finding in this respect?

Former Ambassador Husain Haqqani emerged as a common factor in both the memorandum and the Abbottabad Commission reports. He has been held answerable for his role in the reckless issuance of visas to foreign nationals from Pakistan’s embassy in DC.

Was the commission making a veiled reference to the ‘Haqqani-presidency nexus’ when it placed the “primary responsibility for aiding and abetting establishment of CIA’s network” on Haqqani’s “principals” to whom he directly reported and sought their instructions? Why didn’t the commission clearly identify and confront his ‘principals’ who are also believed to have masterminded the memorandum?

The former DG ISI Lt-Gen (r) Pasha admitted intelligence failure before an in-camera parliament session on May 13, 2011 and presented himself for accountability before any forum — even offering to resign.

He must be credited for confirming before the commission that there were no written agreements but that a ‘political understanding’ existed on drones and that the Shamsi airbase was used for predator strikes against the people of Pakistan. This proved beyond doubt that Pakistan’s leaders had misled their own people all these years on the drones issue.

The commission’s findings regarding the dubious role of foreign NGOs including Usaid, which were infiltrated by hostile foreign intelligence agencies, came as no surprise. The ISI reportedly regained significant lost ground and disrupted the CIA’s network in Pakistan in 2011-12.

If Pakistan is to regain sovereignty over its own territory, then any remnants of the CIA and other foreign operatives’ networks should be rendered ineffective. Will the PML-N government intervene to limit the expansion project of the under-construction US embassy in Islamabad in line with the commission’s recommendation?

The PML-N government should officially release the commission’s report to the nation to dispel any doubts about the authenticity of the leaked document. The parliament should examine it to bring meaningful reforms in our national security and higher defence structures and the intelligence apparatus — as recommended by the commission.

PM Nawaz Sharif may be averse to the idea of a National Security Council keeping in view bitter memories over this that led to former army chief Gen Jahangir Karamat’s resignation in 1998 as well as the implementation of the same concept by his arch rival Gen (r) Musharraf. By reviving the office of the national security advisor and pursuing the formulation of national security policy as well as a national counterterrorism strategy, the PML-N government seems to be moving forward on some of the commission’s recommendations.

The options of empowering the joint staff headquarters for better coordination in emergent situations or adopting the all-powerful US or UK models duly modified to suit our military operational/cultural environments as recommended by the commission also merit a deliberate review.

By not naming the top leaders who wielded “primacy authority and influence in national decision-making” and who were blamed by the commission for “creating the environment in which the May 2, 2011 incident occurred”, the commission in fact closed the door to their accountability forever. Does the commission really expect that these ‘honourable men’ would do the ‘honourable’ thing and submit a formal apology to the nation for their dereliction?

The Abbottabad compound stands demolished. But the national humiliation of May 2 may be difficult to overcome.

The writer is a retired brigadier. Email: fhkhan 54@gmail.com