Perils of religious economy

Though Operation Zarb-e-Azb is yet to be completed and assessing its impact could be postponed till a later stage, it has undeniably brought a sense of relief to Pakistanis who had waited long to see a serious response to religious extremism. The military has claimed meaningful successes in dismantling  the infrastructure of terrorism in North Waziristan and the anticipated response from the terrorists has been contained to a large extent.

On the other hand, the political landscape is marred by violent expressions along the sectarian divide, with the ongoing revolutionary long marches only adding to the chaos. Politicians warned us that it could boil down to a situation similar to those witnessed in Syria, Iraq and Libya. Looking at the past few decades, it is an undeniable fact that the problem of religious intolerance has deep roots in our polity and society. Hence, the issue needs deeper introspection of the role of religious actors as well as the relationship between state and religion. Let us try a new conceptual framework to evaluate the present context.

Contemporary sociologists Bainbridge, Stark and Finke have researched the idea of “religious economy” in the past thirty years. The concept is so fresh that most encyclopaedias and dictionaries do not contain a definition of the term. However, this concept would be useful in studying religion-related behaviour in the politics of our country.

These theorists have applied Adam Smith’s theory of rational choice of the individual in economic decisions in the religious milieu. Rationality here means instrumental rationality that counts only costs against benefits. The main assumption is that the individual chooses to be part of a religious group, denomination or activity by making a careful choice about the benefits attached to this relationship. This choice is not always free in the real sense due to external influences.

Freedom of choice, howsoever relative, is primarily influenced by state policies positively or negatively. State policies can either enhance religious freedom (choices) for the individual by using James Edison’s prescription of playing the neutral arbiter or, on the contrary, reduce religious freedom for everyone by taking sides with one or more religious groups. Pakistan would certainly fall in the second category.

We in Pakistan are more familiar with the term theocracy and the much castigated term secularism. While theocracy defines political underpinnings, the term religious economy defines the more economic dynamics of the phenomenon which can be observed in different types of state – that is, religion relationships. Thus theocracy and religious economy are two different ways of looking at the same reality.

Academically speaking religious economy is a subsection of political economy, a branch of knowledge that studies the relationship between the individual and the state in relation to its economic and political policy framework. Sociologists, though, would be more comfortable using the lens of the ‘sociology of religion’.

Religious economy works on demand and supply rules, the same way as normal political economy. The state’s preference for a particular religion creates the initial demand for commoditised religious standards entailing marginalisation of smaller group(s). Exclusion of smaller group(s) accompanies a tag of hatred and discrimination in order to create certified brand(s) of the product(s). Therefore, though initially a by-product, religious hatred sells more than the product itself as religious conflicts, of whatsoever intensity, become profitable.

The produce of the religious economy in clergy, the workforce, rituals, religious artefacts, audio-visual products, televangelism and attire ensures longevity of its demand. The enhanced demand for religious product gives rise to supplies, contractors and petty contractors in a free competition.

Hybrid religious institutions replace conventional products along with the old marketing skills. Much like a market economy the state surrenders part of its sovereignty to religious economy as it grows. This inevitably means social and political space for religious actors.

Religious economy established through exclusion of smaller religious groups by the state is inherently divisive and destabilising because it thrives by setting up religious monopoly through elimination of the weak producers. Elimination of competing actors sets a negative precedent for survival. As a result, though the religious economy flourishes, society suffers instability when the competing negative interests remain active.

A large part of the Rs140 billion that Pakistanis give in alms annually, according to the Pakistan Centre of Philanthropy, is contested for by several religiously motivated charitable organisations. This is only a fraction of financial sources available to religious organisations which today appear to be better resourced than social and political organisations of the comparable sizes. The budget of seminaries surpasses far beyond what public schools get annually and are also better managed.

This is why we see actors, especially new players, in the religious economy who are inclined to demand more space in the political system. The consistent efforts of inquilab marches exemplifies this tendency.

It is also true that religious economy is neither always bad nor can it be eliminated entirely. Its benign role and effects can be maintained by making the actors comply with non-interference with the freedom of other religious groups. That is possible when the state can set the example by applying the rule on itself first.

Second, religious economy is largely undocumented and informal and it will resist the state machinery’s oversight or influence over religious organisations. If the state does not step in as a true neutral arbiter, we are doomed to see more hostility between the new and old actors, hybrid or traditional extremists and one or the other brand of religiosity. The state machinery which has weakened due to economic challenges, crime and deteriorating rule of law cannot be expected to exert its writ. There is no denial that the situation is extremely volatile. Self-righteous hate speech, a product of informal and inflated religious economy, is blocking progress.

The situation can be repaired through structural reforms, abdicating the policy of preference around religion and religious groups, and by making religious economy comply with the law of the land. Politicians who defended laws of religious insult have suddenly realised the lethal nature of this double edged weapon.

While election reforms are being considered, which we believe will address the question of political participation comprehensively, is it possible that all political parties are made to comply with the rule they shall not indulge in religious matters of other religious groups so that abuse of religion can be stopped.

Second, education reforms have long been neglected. Besides removing religious hatred from textbooks, the government should raise the standard of education at public schools and encourage the good schools run by religious organisations.

Finally, the defeat of religious extremism in Waziristan or tactical retrieval of the negative social capital do not necessarily add stability to the national economy or to democracy. A paradigm shift in favour of genuine equality among religious identities is an imperative that no nation in the world has achieved without establishing principles of non-discrimination and by providing institutions for implementing this golden principle of democratic dispensation.

Email: jacobpete@gmail.com