Once upon a time in the valley of death

At 0930 hours last August 6, the Directorate of Military Operations of the Pakistan Army and its counterpart in India conducted a scheduled hotline call. The conversation between the two MO directorates – ostensibly, the pivotal ‘ops’ nerve centres for both armies – lasted a few minutes as the rival officers discussed routine matters and clicked off.

At 0949 hours, Omar Abdullah, the young, tech savvy chief minister of Indian-held Jammu & Kashmir would tweet: “Was briefed early this morning about news that 5 of our soldiers had been killed on the LoC. My heartfelt condolences to their next of kin.”

There was a good question to ask that fateful day: Why didn’t India’s MO Directorate raise the issue of the incident with its counterpart that morning – which the CM of IHJ&K would tweet about a few minutes later – especially as they were already connected officially through their hotline?

A Pakistani intelligence summary would point out the discrepancy: “[The] Indian side did not highlight the incident whereas as per practice this should have been the most important issue in the hotline call”. A Pakistani security source would add: “If the CM knows, and their MO doesn’t raise it, it means the MO either doesn’t know, which we can’t really believe because it is an Indian Army matter, or that they thought it was something else and not worth taking up with our MO.”

Back to August 6. After the news, and hell, broke loose on Indian media, and details began to emerge (five soldiers belonging to 21 Bihar Regiment and 14 Maratha Light Infantry had been ‘ambushed’ and killed and a sixth one injured around 0100 hours while on patrol in Chakan Da Bagh/Poonch sector), the Indian MO’s office would eventually put in a request for another hotline call that evening – “almost nineteen hours after the alleged incident”, the source would add.

That discrepancy would put Pakistani intelligence into overdrive. The Indian Army’s behaviour was unusual. ‘Special’ requests from India’s MO had been submitted before, but they usually preceded mainstream and social media reports. Also, what were six soldiers (one had “managed to hide himself” according to The Hindu) of an ‘Area Domination Team’ from two different units doing out of typical formation? Infantry patrols usually move around in a group of ten or eleven (structured and known as a ‘section’ in both armies) at the very least.

Also, if the troops were in the vulnerable ‘unit transition’ phase, where the outgoing unit is tasked to familiarise the incoming unit with its area of responsibility, even small deployments of soldiers wouldn’t go on patrol at night for that purpose. Interestingly, the same questions were being asked on the margins of the mainstream Indian media.

The next day, at 0930 hours, the especially requested MO hotline call came and the Indians protested. Pakistan’s MO denied any involvement and ISPR issued a press release. But the investigation underway by Pakistani intelligence would lead Rawalpindi in a different direction.

“There were inconsistencies. And then we figured out that incident was initially reported as an IS [internal security] issue,” a military source would say. An intelligence brief would detail: “Five soldiers did die on 6/8/2013, but not in the manner hyped by the Indians. They were probably shot by locals, at point blank range.”

The brief would further postulate: “FIRs are not usually lodged after fire engagements. But there was an FIR lodged in Punch [sic] Police Station (No 113) on 6/8/2013 about the incident, citing the killings. Post-mortem reports also indicate that Indian Army soldiers were shot point blank…while never discharging any rounds from their weapons.” I did see a copy of the Indian FIR, obtained from intelligence officials, but was not able to independently verify the findings of the autopsy reports.

“This is what we think happened,” the intelligence source would conclude. “There were six of them, out of formation. That explains why they went out at night, maybe after a local village girl, as they have in the past. The locals caught them and shot them at point blank range…most possibly they were angry. Remember, no rounds were fired from officially issued weapons, and there were also reports on their media that their weapons were stolen, which is a good alibi. The sixth guy escaped and probably shot himself in the foot. He’s still with the army. They haven’t exposed him to anyone for interviews.”

Regardless of Pakistani intel’s analyses, the days after the incident saw varying descriptions of what happened being floated by different branches of the Indian government: Starting from the furore-creating suo motu statement by Indian Defence Minister A K Antony on August 6, ‘terrorists’, ‘terrorists dressed as regular Pakistani troops’, ‘regulars’, ‘specialist troops’, ‘SSG’s Musa company’, even a ‘combined force’ of Pakistani Special Forces and jihadists (‘Border Action Teams’ according to Indian officials) would be blamed, in slow-motion and over days of briefings and leaks, for the killings.

It would be a messy, agonising war of versions about Pakistan – but between different branches of the Indian government – and would keep India’s noisy media busy and South Asia watchers worried, while providing the Indian opposition with enough batter to fry a government. By the way, the initial FIR about the incident only cited “terrorists”, and not what eventually emerged from New Delhi’s MoD and/or South Block. Eventually, after initial hiccups, all major Indian actors and agencies would get their anti-Pakistan groove back. But why the initial inconsistency about what is, sadly, a routine matter on the LoC?

“The opposite of what the Indian narrative insists about Pakistan is actually happening here,” Sartaj Aziz, advisor for national security and foreign affairs would tell me in a recent television interview. “We are in a transition, but different sides are thinking alike. There is a maturity here regarding India.”

What Aziz wouldn’t say on television is what is being talked about town: that there is an increasing understanding between Rawalpindi and Islamabad that New Delhi is trying to drive a wedge between Pakistan’s new government and it’s old guard.

Critically, as Pakistan’s establishment and elected leaders make extra efforts to shed their ‘bad boy’ image while anticipating 2014 – hosting Hamid Karzai, releasing Taliban prisoners, trying to convince Mullah Umar & Co to talk to the Afghan High Peace Council – both GHQ and the Foreign Office feel that the Indian approach, driven by an aggressive military-media combine (even GoCs are giving press statements in IHJ&K now), is meant to both undermine Pakistan’s international role as a credible peace broker in the Afghan reconciliation process as well as focus international attention on the ‘P-word’: Proxy War. In this worldview, it is feared that the notion that Pakistan will start routing militants away from Afghanistan and into Kashmir – an argument often made in the 1990s and 2000s by New Delhi – is going to be reintroduced as the new, post-2014 narrative in South Asia.

Internally, there is another perceived Indian angle: politics. After Antony’s initially measured statements were denigrated as a boo-boo by a fiery opposition in what is looking like the beginning of the Indian election campaign season, Islamabad assesses that Congress will take the detour – troubled economy, rape scandals, communal riots, bad press et al – to look tough on Pakistan. “Unsurprisingly, Pak-bashing is a safe electoral strategy. But is it good statesmanship?” asked a Foreign Office source.

But there is hope yet for a breakthrough. Pakistan’s Foreign Office is preparing vigorously for a crucial huddle, when Nawaz Sharif and Manmohan Singh will soon bump into each on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly. The Foreign Office thinks that particular peace ball is in India’s court for now. “I know Manmohan Singh. Our relationship goes back, way back”, Sartaj Aziz optimistically surmised. “I know he would never miss an opportunity to meet with our Prime Minister. He’s too good a statesman to not give peace a chance.”

Yet, there are still question marks about GHQ and Raiwind’s one-pagedness in other areas: is the APC-driven peace process in play, after Maj-Gen Sanaullah Niazi’s death, and how will it affect military dynamics with India? Who will be the new army chief? And when will the PM’s big ‘let’s trade’ MFN narrative translate into actual trade gains for India and Pakistan? A security official confirmed that “no hardcore consultations” are ongoing in those regards. Concluded

The writer is a Harvard Kennedy School Fellow and multimedia journalist. Email: wajskhan@gmail.com

Twitter: @wajskhan