Fear of the recluse

American friends are greatly irritated when others blame their country for so many ills of this world. But they cannot deny that it was the US that first released the nuclear genie. The rest, as they say, is history. And its footnote reads that till today, the US is the only nation that has used the A-bomb in a war.

No wonder that since then the US is extremely nervous about the prospect of another power using the nuclear weapon, even if it comes in the theatrical form of sabre-rattling by the world’s most reclusive but inflammable regime – North Korea.

A quick glance at the years that followed World War II reveals that once the US dropped atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the nuclear genie did not rest; it instead resurfaced in the Soviet Union, Britain, France and China. The five permanent members (P-5) of the UN Security Council succeeded in establishing a balance of terror with each one of them, developing a nuclear arsenal according to its threat perceptions and resources.

While the two superpowers ended up in attaining the capability of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), the remaining three members of the P-5, set their own criteria of nuclear deterrence, motivated among other considerations, by a firm resolve to remain at the high table of the global power game.

Japan and Germany, despite their economic weight are still struggling to join the Security Council as permanent members. Coincidentally, they do not possess nuclear weapons. Some others followed the P-5 in the quest for nuclear capability. Smaller nuclear genies started to appear at the regional level.

However, India-Pakistan and Brazil-Argentina ended up competing in the nuclear race. The outcome varied in so far as the South American rivals agreed to abandon their military nuclear programmes. But the two South Asian rivals, India and Pakistan, resolved to pursue their nuclear research and development for military aims.

The crucial decision to carry out the first nuclear test in South Asia was taken by Indira Gandhi after the Bangladesh war, to firmly establish India’s regional primacy but also to demonstrate that India would not be found in a position of weakness as seen during President Nixon’s famous ‘tilt’ toward Pakistan in 1971.

It took India three years to carry out its first ‘peaceful’ nuclear test, but almost a quarter century would pass before India decisively came out of the closet. Playing on the psychology of her neighbour and rival, India dared Pakistan to prove its nuclear muscle. The result was foretold and in a self-fulfilling prophecy by the west, the detonation of our bomb was celebrated in most Islamic countries.

It is generally acknowledged that the establishment of nuclear deterrence by India and Pakistan has reduced the risk of a major conventional war in the Subcontinent. The nuclear genie also resurfaced in South Africa, Israel and North Korea. Iran ended up in reviving the nuclear programme begun under the Shah but shut down by the Islamic regime. The main reason for this reversal was the feeling of insecurity felt by Tehran in the face of threats of regime change from the US.

North Korea had similar fears from America and felt very vulnerable after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of communist East Germany. There is, however, a clear contrast between the Iranian and North Korean stance. Iran refutes western/Israeli claims of pursuing nuclear weapons capability, while Pyongyang wants the world to take note of its capacity to strike with nuclear arms.

Israel’s exploitation of Iran’s purported nuclear ambition is odd because it possesses nuclear weapons, has the capability of striking anywhere in the region, and can even count on US assistance. The truth is that Iran’s reasons for acquiring nuclear capability are similar to those of North Korea. Both want to deter the Americans from interfering with their internal systems. It should be remembered that South Africa renounced its nuclear programme in exchange for being integrated into the international community.

Can the same approach work for the two regimes hanging tough in Tehran and Pyongyang? In short, give them recognition, renounce regime change and work out peaceful coexistence.

President Obama, who had returned home after carefully avoiding the diplomatic minefields of the Middle East, did not seem to be too concerned with North Korean threats of strikes against South Korea or the US. Washington and its allies are used to dealing with the potential foyer de guerre that has existed in the Korean peninsula for six decades.

Young Kim’s bluster may have led to increased adrenaline levels in North Korea but did not cause panic in the US, which has the means to destroy Korean weapons over the high seas. The emphasis in the US and to some extent in South Korea is more on the semantics of North Korean fulminations. North Korea’s traditional friends, China and muhammad.babar.5661@facebook.com can help in bringing down the tensions by addressing the fears prevailing in Pyongyang.

The concept of nuclear deterrence has come full circle. The ‘do as I say, not as I do’ sermon does not work when regime change is hanging like a sword. Obama put a speedy end to military operations in Iraq, announced a deadline to wind up the war in Afghanistan, and does not want to initiate new wars in his second term. Can he marshal the diplomatic and economic means necessary to have US demands accepted by Iran and North Korea?

The writer is a former ambassador to the European Union. Email: saeed.saeedk@ gmail.com