Difficult to rig

The common perception in Pakistan is that every general election, with the possible exception of that held in 1970, has been rigged. However, there is little analysis on the mode or extent of rigging.

One generally ignored aspect is that for any government, however strongly entrenched, it is well nigh impossible to ‘steal the mandate’. If that were possible, the authoritarian regi­mes of Ziaul Haq or Musharraf would not have been so fearful of holding a general election. It was only after Musharraf felt confident about the electoral success of the so-called ‘King’s party’ that he opted for a general election. Even then, a simple majority proved elusive.

Ayub Khan also had to resort to restricting eligible voters to 80,000 (the ‘basic democrats’) when the number of Pakistanis of voting age was close to 60 million. What could have prompted Yayha Khan to venture into the untested experiment of holding a general election based on adult franchise? The only plausible explanation is that he had been assured by his military advisers that given the multiple number of parties, it was unlikely that anyone would secure a majority. But the election results stunned the junta and it had to adopt a different strategy to subvert the public mandate. Imran Khan must not regress to the PNA mode According to most accounts, the 1977 elections were ‘massively’ rigged and, therefore, the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) protest movement. Yet, rigging allegations have not been subjected to much close scrutiny.

The White Paper published by the Ziaul Haq government was one such attempt but it hardly contains any tangible evidence of planned rigging. It merely contains ‘confessional’ statements by some officials about their ‘role’, for example that of Munir Hussain Shah, the chief secretary of NWFP in 1977: he was ‘directed’ to ensure that non-PPP candidates, including retired Air Marshal Asghar Khan, should not be ‘allowed’ to win. Ironically, the only time the venerable Mr Khan won in an election was in 1977.

The sound and fury generated by the post-election PNA movement did convince many people about extensive rigging. The sordid episode of Jan Abbasi of the Jamaat-i-Islami being harassed and abducted to prevent him from contesting against Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in Larkana was widely quoted as strong evidence of the government’s mala fide intentions. Notwithstanding this unjustifiable administrative abuse, it is inconceivable that in any fair election Bhutto could have been defeated in his home constituency.

Yes, in several constituencies — particularly in Punjab — anecdotal evidence suggests that candidates of the ruling party won with the connivance of local administration. In order to facilitate a quick redressal of such ‘rigging’, a presidential ordinance was issued empowering the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) to investigate, which declared the results of some 15 constituencies invalid. However, this action or even the substantive offer of countrywide re-election failed to mollify the PNA leadership.

Subsequent events prove that the PNA had a one-point agenda: the ouster of the government followed by fresh elections. The participation of large crowds in the PNA’s protest movement convinced the leadership that in any ‘fair’ election, they would emerge winners. However, in the years following the Zia takeover, realisation dawned that it would not be possible to defeat the PPP; hence the chorus of ‘accountability before elections’. This provided a convenient ploy to postpone the elections indefinitely.

The first general election after Zia presents an interesting pattern. Apprehensive of the PPP’s prospects, the government resorted to several gimmicks. The increase in voting age from 18 years to 21, the introduction of separate electorates, the re­­quirement of a valid national identity card, the cobbling together of opposition parties in the form of the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad, doling out funds to ‘other’ parties and the elimination of the sword (the PPP’s original election symbol) from the list of approved election symbols were all meant to disenfranchise potential PPP voters. Yet, these shenanigans failed to prevent the PPP from emerging as the single largest party.

Pakistan’s electoral history has a clear message: even if the combined ‘evil forces’ — the ECP, returning officers, the caretaker chief minister of Punjab, a media house and the chief justice — had all decided to vest the electoral mandate in the party of their choice, they could not have succeeded.

The 2013 elections should have brought much joy to Imran Khan, who has emerged as a strong force. He can either build on that or regress to the PNA mode: mobilising public protest to destabilise an elected government.

Charlatans such as Tahirul Qadri and political orphans like Sheikh Rashid and the Chaudhries of Gujrat are prodding him to follow the second option, but his well-wishers hope that sanity will prevail. Khan’s decision will determine whether the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf is relegated to a footnote in history — like Asghar Khan’s Tehreek-i-Istiqlal — or marches on to become a party representing national aspirations.

The writer is the former CEO of the Pakistan Credit Rating Agency, javedmasud14@gmail.com