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A craven approach

The army chief’s speech on Martyrs Day about two weeks ago was addressed not only to the soldiers but indirectly also to the civilian government. It has been widely commented upon in the context of recent tensions in civil-military relations arising from the government’s handling of Musharraf’s treason trial.

What our commentators have largely missed, however, is that the speech also indicates differences, if not strains, between the Nawaz government and the military leadership over Kashmir, and in particular over the Nawaz government’s deviation from the country’s long-standing policy on this issue.

In his speech, Raheel restated that policy. To emphasise the central importance of Kashmir in Pakistan’s national priorities, he used Quaid-e-Azam’s words (“jugular vein”) to describe Kashmir, as an indirect way of signalling to the government that it must remain the core issue in any dialogue with India.

The army chief then pointed to the fundamental importance of the UN Security Council resolutions on Kashmir and stressed that a settlement of the dispute in accordance with the aspirations of the Kashmiris was essential for regional security and lasting peace. Raheel’s speech has put the spotlight on the two main differences between the government and the military on the issue.

First, the government has decided that the ‘normalisation’ of relations with India and in particular the expansion of trade and economic relations has a higher priority and should be de-linked from a Kashmir settlement and even from an easing of India’s ruthless repression of the Kashmiri people. This policy was started under Zardari but has been fast-tracked by the Nawaz government, which no longer treats Kashmir as the core question but as one of many issues to be discussed by the two sides. The army, for its part, has reservations on sidelining Kashmir and is unenthusiastic about opening the floodgates to trade with India, but is not trying to impose a veto.

Second, the government is banking on the back channel dialogue on Kashmir for a solution and in order to showits willingness to make compromises has already given in to the Indian demand that Pakistan should stop referring to the UN Security Council resolutions on the dispute.

True, Nawaz is not the first Pakistani leader to have played down the relevance of the UN resolutions. That honour goes to Musharraf. But the then military dictator did not conceal his change of stance from the Pakistani public. In fact, he announced publicly in December 2003 that he was prepared to “lay aside” these resolutions in the search for a settlement of the dispute.

On the other hand, Nawaz typically has not had the courage – or the honesty – to tell the public about his decision to backtrack from the UNSC resolutions. He has tried to keep the country in the dark and has made this commitment surreptitiously through his special envoy for India, Shaharyar Khan.

The Indian reaction to Raheel’s remarks on Kashmir mainly reflects worries that the Nawaz government might be restrained by the military from delivering on the promises the prime minister has made to India on Kashmir and trade. India’s rejection of the army chief’s statement was predictable. But more important, Indian Foreign Minister Khurshid as well as the spokesperson of the BJP, which is confident of forming the next government in Delhi, have asked the army chief to leave the matter to bilateral discussions between the civilian authorities.

It is hardly surprising that India would like the Pakistani army to be excluded from the policy-making process on Kashmir. The reason is simple and has nothing to do with constitutional proprieties or civilian supremacy. The plain explanation is that the civilian government has been remarkably complaisant towards India. This is especially true of Nawaz’s special emissaries on India, official and unofficial, like Shahbaz, Shaharyar and the former’s son, Salman. Not only the army but the foreign ministry has also been bypassed.

It is also significant that there has been no reaction from the Pakistan government to India’s rejection of Raheel’s Kashmir statement. The message from our civilian government is that it too would like the army to stay out of the policy discussion on Kashmir and India.

That of course is neither desirable, nor proper, nor possible. Because of the responsibility the armed forces bear for defence against India and because of the narrow perspective and venality of much of our political class, the military’s input is essential and it is very important that its viewpoint is given due weightage.

There is also a constitutional imperative. Article 257 states that when the people of the state of Jammu and Kashmir decide to accede to Pakistan, the relationship between Pakistan and that state will be determined in accordance with the wishes of the people of that state. This language implies that any settlement other than one which provides for the accession of Kashmir to Pakistan would be unconstitutional.The statement by the army chief is in conformity with this article, while the out-of-the-box solution pursued by Musharraf and the willingness of the Nawaz government to put the issue on the back burner and to virtually discard the UN resolutions goes against the spirit, if not also the letter, of Article 257 and could be challenged in court.

True, the prospect that the Kashmiris will win the azadi that they yearn for are not bright in the near future. But the most remarkable thing about the freedom movement is that it keeps getting stronger from year to year and generation to generation. Despite massive repression by India, the Kashmiris have not given up. The least Pakistan should be doing is to maintain its political, moral and diplomatic support for their struggle. Yet the Nawaz government has quietly been cutting it down.

Nawaz’s craven approach on Kashmir was evident also from the failure of the government to endorse the call given by leaders of the Kashmiri freedom movement for a boycott of ‘elections’ in Occupied Kashmir to six seats in the lower house of the Indian parliament. The boycott call was followed enthusiastically throughout the valley. According to Indian media, while ‘separatist’ groups had called for a strike for only one day (April 30) on the polling day for the Srinagar constituency, people all over the valley observed a spontaneous shutdown for the two following days as well.

As in the past, the Indian authorities resorted to every trick in the trade in their attempt to show a respectable level of voter participation. The process was staggered over five days to allow a heavy concentration of police, paramilitary forces and the army, nearly 700,000 in all, on the day of the polls, mainly to intimidate protestors calling for a boycott. The pro-azadi Kashmiri leaders were detained and there was a massive crackdown on those calling for a boycott.

Yet, even according to the inflated figures released by India, only about a quarter of the registered voters turned out in the three constituencies of the Kashmir Valley. Voter turnout was 28 percent in Anantnag, 26 percent in Srinagar and 39 percent in Baramulla according to Indian officials. In the Ladakh constituency, which comprises the districts of Leh and Kargil and where Buddhists and Muslims are about evenly balanced, the Indians have claimed a 65 percent turnout. In the two constituencies of the Jammu region – Jammu-Poonch and Udhampur-Doda – where the Hindus are now in a majority thanks to the massacre and expulsions of Muslims at the time of Partition, the turnout was high.

It is not clear what Nawaz expects to get from the next government of India in return for the weak approach he has adopted. Appeasement and grovelling is certainly no way to conduct foreign policy. Nor will it help the country overcome its economic woes. Those problems are rooted in the licence enjoyed by the country’s ruling class to plunder the wealth and resources of the country and in the failure of the government to invest in human capital. Trade with India and betrayal of the Kashmiris are certainly not the solution.

The writer is a former member of the Pakistan Foreign Service.   Email: asifezdi@yahoo.com

Asif Ezdi, "A craven approach," The News. 2014-05-12.
Keywords: Political science , International policy , Political process , Political issues , Security policy , Military-Pakistan , Government-Pakistan , Muslims , PM Nawaz Sharif , Asif Zardari , Gen Musharraf , CM Shahbaz Sharif , Shaharyar Khan , Pakistan , Kashmir , India , BJP